Somaliland Recognization

[JamesMike]

I don’t know if some of you know that the UK government is considering officially recognizing Somaliland. It certainly would have ramifications in the Horn of Africa if they do. Your opinions would be welcome including @Scepticalscribe.

 

[Scepticalscribe]

I don’t know if some of you know that the UK government is considering officially recognizing Somaliland. It certainly would have ramifications in the Horn of Africa if they do. Your opinions would be welcome including @Scepticalscribe.

No, I did not know this, but am not - now that you have mentioned this - terribly surprised by the news.

Yes, of course, it would have ramifications - enormous ramifications - in the wider Horn of Africa region.

Firstly, this could not have happened - there is no way this could have been contemplated - without Brexit.

This is because UK policy on Somaliland was constrained - or limited - by EU membership and by EU common foreign and security policies, as Somaliland was not (and is not) currently recognised by as an independent state by any country in the world.

Moreover, until Brexit took effect, and the UK had formally departed from the EU, UK participation in the three EU CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Somalia, EUTM Somalia, and the best known of the three, the anti-piracy maritime Operation Atalanta - the operational HQ of which used to be in Northwood, in the UK, - but has been since transferred to Rota in Spain, as a consequence of Brexit) - which had been quite extensive - served as a strong curb on any British political preference to recognise Somaliland.

No EU country recognised Somaliland - and Somaliland, in turn, was (and is) profoundly antagonistic to organisations which operate out of Mogadishu, as it does not recognise - indeed, actively disputes - the federal Government's authority over the region, and attempts to insist that internationals (and supranational and international organisations) can only operate in the region on the basis of recognition of the authorities in Hargeisa.

Likewise, the federal authorities, or government, in Mogadishu attempt to thwart the efforts of organisations, bodies, or internationals who seek to also work out of Hargeisa.

Secondly, while Somaliland is rooted (historically, linguistically, culturally, and yes, I suppose, politically) in the former British Somaliland, I would also argue that the place has one of the most effective, tenacious and persuasive disaporas on the planet; they receive a very sympathetic ear (and press) in the UK, and are extraordinarily effective in promoting their message.

And yes, one must concede Somaliland is the most developed part of Somalia, by a considerable margin, (with Puntland, trailing at some distance, lying in second place).

And thirdly, I don't doubt that possible oil concessions off the coast of Somaliland are playing a role here - and, for that matter - so, too, do issues of who, and what (and under what conditions) - in other words, who will operate, develop and invest in - the ports of Berbera (in Somaliland) and Bosaso (in Puntland).

However, equally, one cannot overlook what is happening in Ethiopia just now, and landlocked Ethiopia's strategic desire for secure access to a port; while Kenya is the economic power (and social, cultural, educational power, perhaps, even political power) of the region, Ethiopia is by far the strongest military power, and appears - once again - to be entering a period of profound political instability.

I will say that in my time there that the intense nature of British (diplomatic and political) interest in Somaliland - even though the UK was, at that time, still a member of the EU - was quite extraordinary and, yes, I must admit that I was somewhat taken aback.

 

[JamesMike]

No, I did not know this, but am not - now that you have mentioned this - terribly surprised by the news.

Yes, of course it would have ramifications - enormous ramifications in the wider Horn of Africa region.

Firstly, this could not have happened - there is no way this could have been contemplated - without Brexit.

This is because UK policy on Somaliland was constrained - or limited - by EU membership and by EU common foreign and security policies, as Somaliland was not (and is not) currently recognised by as an independent state by any country on the planet.

Moreover, until Brexit took effect, and the UK had formally departed from the EU, UK participation in the three EU CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Somalia, EUTM Somalia, and the best known of the three, the anti-piracy maritime Operation Atalanta - the operational HQ of which used to be in Northwood, in the UK, - but has been since transferred to Rota in Spain, as a consequence of Brexit) - which had been quite extensive - served as a strong curb on any British political preference to recognise Somaliland.

No EU country recognised Somaliland - and Somaliland, in turn, was (and is) profoundly antagonistic to organisations which operate out of Mogadishu, as it does not recognise - indeed, actively disputes - the federal Government's authority over the region, and attempts to insist that internationals (and supranational and international organisations) can only operate in the region on the basis of recognition of the authorities in Hargeisa.

Likewise, the federal authorities, or government, in Mogadishu attempt to thwart the efforts of organisations, bodies, or internationals who seek to also work out of Hargeisa.

Secondly, while Somaliland is rooted (historically, linguisticaly, culturally, and yes, I suppose, politically) in the former British Somaliland, I would also argue that the place has one of the most effective, tenacious and persuasive disaporas on the planet; they receive a very sympathetic ear (and press) in the UK, and are extraordinarily effective in promoting their message.

And yes, one must concede Somaliland is the most developed part of Somalia, by a considerable margin, (with Puntland, trailing at some distance, lying in second place).

And thirdly, I don't doubt that possible oil concessions off the coast of Somaliland are playing a role here - and, for that matter - so, too, do issues of who, and what (and under what conditions) will operate (and develop and invest in) the ports of Berbera (in Somaliland) and Bosaso (in Puntland).

However, equally, one cannot overlook what is happening in Ethiopia just now, and landlocked Ethiopia's strategic desire for secure access to a port; while Kenya is the economic power (and social, cultural, educational power,) of the region, Ethiopia is by far the strongest military power, and appears - once again - to be entering a period of profound political instability.

I will say that in my time there that the intense nature of British (diplomatic and political) interest in Somaliland - even though the UK was, at that time, still a member of the EU - was quite extraordinary and, yes, I must admit that I was somewhat taken aback.

Excellent analysis.